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ABSTRACT—The President should have the power to veto constitutional 
amendment proposals. After all, Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution 
provides that “[e]very Order, Resolution, or Vote” requiring “the 
Concurrence” of both houses of Congress must be “presented to the 
President” for approval or veto. Constitutional amendment proposals 
unmistakably require the concurrence of both houses of Congress (by two-
thirds majorities, no less). Yet all three branches of the federal government, 
with varying degrees of consistency, have decided that constitutional 
amendment proposals need not be presented to the President. I argue that 
Article V, which defines the amendment process, is bound by Article I, 
Section 7’s strictures and the President is thus empowered to veto 
congressional amendment proposals as both a textual and a normative 
matter. Recognizing the implications of this conclusion, I propose broad 
definitions of presentment and approval to rescue the validity of the 
existing twenty-seven amendments while requiring all future constitutional 
amendment proposals to be presented to the President for approval or veto. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the 2012 Republican presidential primary campaign, an 
interviewer asked candidate Herman Cain whether he supported a 
constitutional amendment banning abortion: 
Q:   Are you for some sort of pro-life amendment to the Constitution 
that in essence would trump Roe v. Wade? 
CAIN: Yes. Yes, I feel that strongly about it. You know, if we can get the 
necessary support and it comes to my desk, I’ll sign it. That’s all I 
can do. I will sign it.1 
Commentators were quick to derisively question Cain’s “grasp of the 
Constitution” because the President is presumed to have no official role in 
the constitutional amendment process.2 I contend that the former pizza 
mogul’s “error” was perfectly understandable and his grasp of the 
Constitution—at least, that of its plain text—is perfectly sound. 
Article I, Section 7, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution 
provides: “Every Bill . . . shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the 
President” for approval or veto.3 Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 extends the 
presentment requirement to “[e]very Order, Resolution, or Vote to which 
 
1 Interview by David Brody with Herman Cain (Oct. 22, 2011) (emphases added), available at 
http://youtu.be/uy_Kp6uBHQw?hd=1&t=59s (transcription by author); see also David Brody, Herman 
Cain Exclusive: Tells Brody File He Will Support Constitutional Amendments on Life and Marriage, 
BRODY FILE (Oct. 22, 2011, 10:13 PM), http://blogs.cbn.com/thebrodyfile/archive/2011/10/22/herman-
cain-exclusive-tells-brody-file-he-will-support-constitutional.aspx. 
2 E.g., Ben Smith, Cain Would Autograph Life Amendment, POLITICO (Oct. 23, 2011, 12:51 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/1011/Cain_would_autograph_life_amendment.html. 
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
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the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be 
necessary (except on a question of Adjournment).”4 
Article V prescribes the method for amending the Constitution: “The 
Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, 
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, . . . which . . . shall be 
valid . . . when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several 
States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof . . . .”5 Article V is silent 
on whether amendment proposals must be presented to the President, and 
in Hollingsworth v. Virginia, the Supreme Court—in a footnote—
summarily declared that the Presentment Clause does not apply to Article 
V and the President has no formal role in the constitutional amendment 
process.6 Predictably, Congress has embraced the President’s absence from 
the Article V process, albeit with some inconsistency.7 Less predictably, 
presidents, perhaps following the early example of George Washington,8 
have acquiesced to this long-standing practice.9 
I argue that the Presentment Clause does indeed apply to Article V 
based on the text of the Constitution and the structure of our federal 
government. Article I, Section 7 is clear that every bill, order, resolution, 
and vote must be presented to the President, and Article V, like other 
provisions calling for congressional action, makes no explicit exception to 
this rule, thereby leaving the default presumption in place. And although 
the Constitution requires Congress to muster a two-thirds majority in each 
house to pass constitutional amendments (the same supermajority required 
to override a presidential veto), vote tallies may change once the President 
formally weighs in on the matter. In both the House and the Senate, 
motions to override a presidential veto have in fact received different vote 
tallies than the respective bills received upon initial passage. 
I further argue that amendment proposals should be presented to the 
President as a normative matter. Giving the President the power to veto 
congressional legislation is an important structural protection that preserves 
 
4 Id. cl. 3. I refer to Clauses 2 and 3 collectively as “the Presentment Clause.” 
5 Id. art. V. 
6 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 381 n.* (1798) (statement at oral argument of Chase, J.). 
7 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 629–31 (1865) (Senate debate noting that President 
Lincoln had signed the Thirteenth Amendment and adopting a resolution stating that presentment was 
inadvertent and nonprecedential). 
8 See George Washington, First Inaugural Address (Apr. 30, 1789), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF 
THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, S. DOC. 101-10, at 1, 4 (1989) (stating a desire to stay out of 
the constitutional amendment process, being “guided by no lights derived from official opportunities” 
to do so). 
9 The only exceptions have been James Buchanan, who signed the Corwin Amendment (which 
would have effectively legalized slavery in the United States), and Abraham Lincoln, who signed the 
Thirteenth Amendment. See Herman V. Ames, The Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States During the First Century of its History, in 2 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN 
HISTORICAL SOCIETY FOR THE YEAR 1896, at 3, 296 (1897). 
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the checks and balances inherent in our federal government. Denying the 
President this power over one of the most important congressional actions, 
proposing constitutional amendments, undermines these checks and 
balances. What is more, forcing the President to take an official stand on an 
amendment can help clarify the debate and engage the nation, thereby 
benefiting democracy. 
Despite these textual and normative reasons why the Presentment 
Clause must apply to Article V, history has decided the issue to the 
contrary. I describe this history and show how the doctrine developed from 
the time of the Framing until Reconstruction, when the issue was 
definitively settled. 
Requiring future amendment proposals to be presented to the President 
is normatively desirable and would restore adherence to the Constitution’s 
plain text. What makes it unpalatable, though, is the inevitable implication 
that all of the previous twenty-seven amendments were unconstitutionally 
adopted and therefore void. That is why I offer an approach to reinterpret 
the Constitution so as to require presentment for future amendments while 
saving all of the previously enacted ones. This approach is to broadly 
construe “presentment” and “approval” to show that all twenty-seven 
amendments have in fact been presented to and approved by the President. 
My argument proceeds in five parts. I first review the history of the 
amendment process in Part I, showing how all three branches of 
government have to varying degrees advocated for or acquiesced in the 
nonpresentment of constitutional amendment proposals. In Part II, I 
analyze the text of the Constitution to conclude that the presentment 
requirement of Article I, Section 7 indeed applies to the Article V 
amendment process. I next argue in Part III that in addition to the textual 
mandate, presentment of amendments is normatively desirable. In Part IV, I 
present an interpretive approach in which presidential presentment may be 
required for future amendments without affecting the constitutionality of 
the existing twenty-seven. 
I. A HISTORY OF NONPRESENTMENT 
That the President has no role in the constitutional amendment process 
is well settled. Perhaps it was settled in 1798 when Justice Chase 
summarily declared during oral argument in Hollingsworth v. Virginia that 
the President “has nothing to do with the proposition, or adoption, of 
amendments to the Constitution.”10 Or maybe it was settled when Congress 
neglected to seek President Washington’s signature on the Bill of Rights in 
1789,11 or when the Senate explicitly disclaimed Congress’s presentment of 
both the (failed) Corwin Amendment and the (eventually successful) 
 
10 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 381 n.* (statement at oral argument of Chase, J.). 
11 See infra note 66 and accompanying text. 
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Thirteenth Amendment to Presidents Buchanan and Lincoln, respectively.12 
Surely it was settled when President Andrew Johnson, who actively 
opposed the Fourteenth Amendment, accepted that he had no power to veto 
it.13 In fact, it might have been settled at the very dawn of the Republic, 
when President George Washington, in his first inaugural address, declined 
even to recommend possible amendments because he would be “guided by 
no lights derived from official opportunities” to do so.14 In short, all three 
branches of government have advocated for or acquiesced in presidential 
passivity in the amendment process. The Judicial and Legislative Branches 
may have been driven by a degree of self-interest in their advocacy or 
acquiescence; it is a little more difficult to understand what might have 
motivated the Executive Branch to abdicate its constitutional authority.15 A 
history lesson is in order. 
A. The Judicial Branch: Hollingsworth v. Virginia 
Hollingsworth v. Virginia16 was the final resolution of a land dispute 
that began in the 1760s between a group of speculators and the state of 
Virginia, which refused to recognize its claims for land in the Ohio 
Valley.17 The speculators organized into a corporation (the Indiana 
Company) in the 1770s18 and eventually filed suit against Virginia in 1792, 
seeking $233,124.66 in damages, plus interest.19 Virginia’s governor, 
Henry Lee, and its attorney general, James Innes, did not believe the suit 
was authorized under Article III, under a theory of state sovereign 
immunity.20 Indeed, Madison had assured the Virginia ratifying convention 
that the proposed Constitution did not authorize such suits: 
[The federal judiciary’s] jurisdiction in controversies between a state and 
citizens of another state is much objected to, and perhaps without reason. It 
is not in the power of individuals to call any state into court. The only 
 
12 See Ames, supra note 9, at 296. 
13 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3349 (1866) (message from President Johnson to the 
Senate). 
14 Washington, supra note 8. 
15 Cf. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2009) (1881) (“The 
life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”). 
16 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798). 
17 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800: 
SUITS AGAINST STATES 274 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1994) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. 
18 Id. at 276. 
19 Id. at 282. 
20 Id. at 282–83. 
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operation it can have, is that, if a state should wish to bring suit against a 
citizen, it must be brought before the federal court.21 
Madison was wrong: On February 18, 1793, the Supreme Court held 
in Chisholm v. Georgia that citizens of another state could sue a state in 
federal court, based on the plain language of Article III.22 
Congress immediately reacted by proposing the Eleventh Amendment, 
which explicitly forbids federal courts from hearing individual suits against 
a state.23 The Amendment passed Congress on March 4, 1794, and the 
requisite twelve states ratified it in less than a year.24 Curiously, the 
Amendment’s status remained unclear until President John Adams issued a 
proclamation on January 8, 1798 (nearly three years later) declaring: “This 
Amendment, having been adopted by three fourths of the Several States, 
may now be declared to be a Part of the Constitution of the United 
States.”25 
Meanwhile, the Hollingsworth case languished on the Supreme 
Court’s docket, largely due to Virginia’s dilatory tactics.26 But once 
President Adams made his January 1798 proclamation, Attorney General 
Charles Lee asked the Supreme Court to rule on Hollingsworth’s 
jurisdictional issue in the February 1798 Term.27 The Court heard oral 
argument on February 10,28 where William Rawle, the attorney for the 
Indiana Company, and William Tilghman, an attorney in a parallel case, 
argued: 
The [Eleventh] amendment has not been proposed in the form prescribed by 
the Constitution, and, therefore, it is void. Upon an inspection of the original 
roll, it appears that the amendment was never submitted to the President for 
his approbation. . . . The concurrence of the President is required in matters 
of infinitely less importance; and whether on subjects of ordinary legislation, 
 
21 Statement of James Madison at the Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in 3 THE DEBATES IN 
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533 (Jonathan 
Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co., 2d ed. 1891). 
22 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 450 (1793) (opinion of Blair, J.) (“A dispute between 
A. and B. is surely a dispute between B. and A. Both cases, I have no doubt, were intended” to be 
covered by the Diversity Clause.). 
23 U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”). 
24 North Carolina ratified the amendment on February 7, 1795. 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra 
note 17, at 600–04 & n.35. 
25 Id. at 604 & n.35. 
26 See id. at 282–89. 
27 Id. at 289. 
28 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 740–41 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1971). 
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or of constitutional amendments, the expression is the same, and equally 
applies to the act of both Houses of Congress.29 
Justice Chase’s response was brief and conclusory: 
There can, surely, be no necessity to answer that argument. The negative of 
the President applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation: He has nothing 
to do with the proposition, or adoption, of amendments to the Constitution.30 
Four days later,31 the Court issued a one-sentence opinion: 
The Court, on the day succeeding the argument, delivered an unnanimous 
[sic] opinion, that the amendment being constitutionally adopted, there could 
not be exercised any jurisdiction, in any case, past or future, in which a state 
was sued by the citizens of another state, or by citizens, or subjects, of any 
foreign state.32 
The Court dismissed the case, along with two others on its docket, all of 
which involved individual suits against states.33 
The holding of Hollingsworth is squarely on point. Yet nowhere does 
the opinion reveal why the President “has nothing to do” with the 
amendment process.34 Justice Chase did not even care for Attorney General 
Lee to respond to the Indiana Company’s assertion: there was “no necessity 
to answer that argument.”35 So although Hollingsworth clearly holds that 
presentment is not required for amendment proposals, it is little more than 
an ipse dixit and thus of questionable precedential value.36 
What is more, the Hollingsworth Court was undoubtedly motivated at 
least in part by pure self-interest. The Court’s decision in Chisholm 
 
29 Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 379 (1798) (argument of W. Tilghman & 
Rawle). 
30 Id. at 381 n.* (statement at oral argument of Chase, J.). 
31 GOEBEL, supra note 28, at 741 n.87 (“The minutes of the Court indicate that on Feb. 10, 1798, 
the argument was heard without reference to any pending cause. The entries for Feb. 14, 1798, start 
with Hollingsworth . . . .”). Curiously, Alexander Dallas reported that the Court issued its opinion “on 
the day succeeding the argument.” Hollingsworth, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 382. No reason is given for this 
discrepancy. 
32 Hollingsworth, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 382. 
33 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 17, at 604 & n.36. 
34 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 381 n.*. 
35 Id. After rhetorically asking, “But has not the same course been pursued relative to all the other 
amendments, that have been adopted?,” Attorney General Lee did respond nonetheless: “And the case 
of amendments is evidently a substantive act, unconnected with the ordinary business of legislation, and 
not within the policy, or terms, of investing the President with a qualified negative on the acts and 
resolutions of Congress.” Id. at 381. 
36 This is not to diminish Hollingsworth’s place in history: at least one renowned commentator has 
argued that it, and not the famous case of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), was the 
first instance of judicial review. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE 
FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789–1888, at 22 (1985) (“Hollingsworth may put to flight the conventional 
wisdom that Marbury v. Madison was the first case in which the Supreme Court held an act of Congress 
unconstitutional.”). 
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triggered a swift and immediate backlash at a time when the federal 
judiciary was a fledgling branch of government with far less power than the 
other two branches.37 The Eleventh Amendment was squarely addressed at 
overturning the decision in Chisholm,38 and for the Court to hold the 
Amendment unconstitutional would have been politically impossible.39 The 
issue of presentment simply could not be extricated from the hot-button 
issue of state sovereign immunity; not surprisingly, political expediency 
won the day. 
Although the Court has never bolstered Hollingsworth’s reasoning, it 
has restated its rule on a few occasions.40 From the judicial perspective, the 
issue is thus settled law. 
B. The Legislative Branch: An Inconsistent History 
Congress has also concluded that constitutional amendment proposals 
need not be presented to the President. Although this result is predictable—
it aggrandizes Congress by granting it unchecked power to propose 
amendments without interference from the Executive Branch—not every 
Congress has reached this conclusion. 
Congress did not seek President Washington’s explicit approval or 
signature for the Bill of Rights; instead, the House merely requested that he 
send all twelve amendments to the states for ratification: 
 On motion, it was resolved, that the President of the United States be 
requested to transmit to the Executives of the several States which have 
ratified the Constitution, copies of the amendments proposed by Congress, to 
be added thereto, and like copies to the Executives of the States of Rhode 
Island and North Carolina.41 
Congress followed a similar practice with what became the Eleventh42 
and Twelfth43 Amendments, as well as with a failed amendment proposal 
 
37 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“[T]he 
judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power . . . .”). 
38 See MARTIN H. REDISH, SUZANNA SHERRY & JAMES E. PFANDER, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES, 
COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 368 (7th ed. 2012); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 334 (2005) (“The Chisholm decision provoked widespread resentment, 
culminating in an amendment designed to overrule the Court.”). 
39 See Charles L. Black, Jr., Correspondence, On Article I, Section 7, Clause 3—and the 
Amendment of the Constitution, 87 YALE L.J. 896, 898 n.11 (1978) (“It should be noted that this case 
was decided literally overnight, and that it is hard to imagine greater pressure on the Supreme Court 
than existed with respect to validating the Eleventh Amendment, which had been passed to correct its 
own universally resented decision in Chisholm . . . .”). 
40 See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955–56 n.21 (1983) (recognizing the holding of 
Hollingsworth as valid and stating that presentment does not apply to the Article V process); Hawke v. 
Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 229–30 (1920) (same). 
41 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 913–14 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (recording the debate in the House 
on Sept. 24, 1789). 
42 See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 65 (1794). 
107:963 (2013) The President’s Role in Constitutional Amendment  
971 
banning titles of nobility.44 In fact, in the case of the Twelfth Amendment, 
“[a] motion in the Senate to submit the amendment to the President for 
approval was rejected by the decisive vote of 7 to 23.”45 
Yet in 1861, Congress presented the Corwin Amendment to the 
President. The Corwin Amendment would have enshrined slavery in the 
Constitution46: 
 No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or 
give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the 
domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or 
service by the laws of said State.47 
Fearful that President-elect Lincoln would disapprove of this 
Amendment, President Buchanan signed it in the waning hours of his 
Administration.48 Buchanan’s fears were unfounded; Lincoln endorsed the 
Amendment’s validity in his inaugural address: 
I understand a proposed amendment to the Constitution, which amendment, 
however, I have not seen, has passed Congress, to the effect that the federal 
government shall never interfere with the domestic institutions of the States, 
including that of persons held to service. To avoid misconstruction of what I 
have said, I depart from my purpose not to speak of particular amendments, 
so far as to say that, holding such a provision to now be implied 
Constitutional law, I have no objection to its being made express, and 
irrevocable.49 
The Corwin Amendment was not ratified by the requisite number of 
states before the Civil War intervened, mooting the issue.50 Four years later, 
Congress passed what would ultimately become the Thirteenth Amendment 
 
43 See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 214 (1803). 
44 See 21 ANNALS OF CONG. 2050–51 (1810) (recording only the passage of the amendment, with 
no further action before adjournment). The amendment was ratified by twelve states. See DAVID C. 
HUCKABEE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-922 GOV, RATIFICATION OF AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION 5 (1997). 
45 Ames, supra note 9. 
46 Thomas Corwin was a Republican Congressman and former Whig Senator from Ohio. Corwin, 
Thomas, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/
scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=C000791 (last visited Jan. 6, 2013). 
47 ROBERT BRADY, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AS AMENDED, H.R. DOC. NO. 110-
50, at 30 (2007). Corwin proposed the amendment in the House on February 27, 1861, but it was 
defeated 123–71. See CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1264 (1861). (Oddly, the House Journal lists 
the vote as 120–71. See 57 H.R. JOURNAL, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 416–21 (1861).) The House passed it 
the next day 133–65, CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1284–85 (1861), and the Senate passed it on 
March 2, 24–12, id. at 1402–03. President Buchanan signed it the same day. Id. at 1408. 
48 See ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM 2 (2004). 
49 Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address 7 (Mar. 4, 1861), available at http://www.loc.gov/
exhibits/treasures/trt039.html. 
50 See DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 
1776–1995, at 150–51 (1996). 
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and again presented it to the President for his signature.51 Although 
President Lincoln signed it, the Senate, on the motion of Senator 
Trumbull,52 immediately adopted a resolution disclaiming the presentment 
as “inadvertent” and nonprecedential.53 
Senator Howe54 objected to Trumbull’s characterization, pointing out 
that the Corwin Amendment already set the precedent for presentment of 
amendments, even if the amendment was not ultimately ratified by the 
states.55 Howe also forcefully argued in favor of presentment, presaging 
some of the arguments made in Parts II and III, infra. Most significantly, 
Howe noted that “presentment” occurred by simple virtue of sending 
copies of amendment proposals to the President for transmittal to the 
various states. So the precedent that had been set was actually to present 
amendments to the President, and not to bypass presentment. Nevertheless, 
the Senate adopted Trumbull’s resolution,56 although no record exists of the 
House adopting a similar resolution.57 
Oddly, even after this debate, Congress presented the Fifteenth 
Amendment to the President. The Fifteenth Amendment passed both 
houses of Congress by the required two-thirds majorities on February 26, 
1869.58 On that date, the Senate Journal records that the House approved 
“an enrolled joint resolution (S.8) and an enrolled bill, (H.R. 1812[]).”59 S.8 
was the “[j]oint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States.”60 The next entry in the Journal reads: “The President pro 
tempore signed the enrolled bill (H.R. 1812) and the enrolled joint 
resolution (S.8) last reported to have been examined, and they were 
delivered to the committee to be presented to the President of the United 
States.”61 
 
51 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 629–31 (1865) (Senate debate noting that President 
Lincoln had signed the Thirteenth Amendment). 
52 Lyman Trumbull was the senior Senator from Illinois and the author of the Thirteenth 
Amendment. See HORACE WHITE, THE LIFE OF LYMAN TRUMBULL 224 (1913). 
53 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 629–31 (1865). 
54 Timothy O. Howe was a Radical Republican from Wisconsin. He was on President Grant’s short 
list to replace Chief Justice Chase but ultimately remained in the Senate and eventually served as 
Postmaster General under President Arthur. See William H. Russell, Timothy O. Howe, Stalwart 
Republican, 35 WIS. MAG. HIST. 90, 90–99 (1951). 
55 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 630 (1865). 
56 Id. at 631. 
57 See 62 H.R. JOURNAL, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 214 (1865) (noting only that the Senate adopted a 
resolution requesting the President to transmit copies of the Thirteenth Amendment to the states for 
ratification but making no mention of Trumbull’s resolution disclaiming the presentment requirement). 
58 See HUCKABEE, supra note 44, at 4 (table entry listing the Fifteenth Amendment as having been 
proposed on February 26, 1869). 
59 36 S. JOURNAL, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 361 (1869). 
60 Id. at 362. 
61 Id. (emphases added). 
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The word “they” clearly means that both the bill and the joint 
resolution—that is, the proposed constitutional amendment—were 
delivered to be presented to the President. No record exists of President 
Johnson signing the Fifteenth Amendment before distributing it to the 
various states for ratification.62 But this entry in the Journal of the Senate 
shows that even after the heated and seemingly decisive debate of February 
1865, Congress continued to display inconsistency in its presentment 
practice.63 
C. The Executive Branch: Presidential Acquiescence 
As noted above, President Buchanan signed the Corwin Amendment, 
and President Lincoln signed the Thirteenth. Both Presidents evidently felt 
they were constitutionally permitted (if not required) to do so. That said, 
these are the only two exceptions to the general rule that presidents do not 
play an active role in the amendment process. 
Like many presidential practices, this behavior can be traced to George 
Washington. In his first inaugural address, Washington forswore any 
involvement with constitutional amendments: 
 Besides the ordinary objects submitted to your care, it will remain with 
your judgment to decide how far an exercise of the occasional power 
delegated by the fifth article of the Constitution is rendered expedient at the 
present juncture by the nature of objections which have been urged against 
the system, or by the degree of inquietude which has given birth to them. 
Instead of undertaking particular recommendations on this subject, in which 
I could be guided by no lights derived from official opportunities, I shall 
again give way to my entire confidence in your discernment and pursuit of 
the public good . . . .64 
Believing he had no “official opportunities” to weigh in on 
constitutional amendments, Washington gave Congress his “entire 
confidence” in the matter.65 Given such ex ante deference to Congress, 
Washington unsurprisingly signed neither the Bill of Rights nor the 
Eleventh Amendment, which was also proposed during his tenure.66 
Other presidents followed Washington’s lead. President John Quincy 
Adams, for example, “refused to recommend an amendment in regard to 
 
62 President Johnson must have acted swiftly to distribute the amendment; on March 1, 1869, just 
three days after Congress passed the joint resolution proposing the amendment, Nevada became the first 
state to ratify it. ROBERT BRADY, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AS AMENDED, H.R. DOC. 
NO. 110-50, at 18 (2007). 
63 There is no evidence in the Senate or House Journals to indicate that any future amendments—
that is, the Sixteenth through the Twenty-Sixth Amendments—were sent to the President explicitly for 
the purpose of approval rather than merely for the purpose of transmittal to the states. 
64 Washington, supra note 8 (emphasis added). 
65 Id. 
66 See KYVIG, supra note 50, at 105, 113; see also supra note 42. 
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the election of President” because he did not believe the President had any 
role to play in the constitutional amendment process.67 Adams also advised 
President Monroe (in whose administration he served as Secretary of State) 
not to propose an amendment in 1817.68 Even here, though, the record is 
mixed—John Quincy Adams was one of the seven Senators (against the 
“decisive” majority of twenty-three) who voted in favor of presenting the 
Twelfth Amendment to the President for his approval in 1803.69 
But neither George Washington’s nor John Quincy Adams’s belated 
deference to Congress can explain the actions of Andrew Johnson, whose 
immediate predecessors (Lincoln and Buchanan) both signed constitutional 
amendments.70 Johnson was no fan of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
actively worked to defeat its ratification.71 And yet he did not veto it.72 
President Johnson assumed he lacked the power to do so, and although he 
dutifully forwarded the Amendment to the states for ratification, he 
pointedly denied that he approved of it: 
 Waiving the question as to the constitutional validity of the proceedings of 
Congress upon the joint resolution proposing the amendment, or as to the 
merits of the article which it submits, through the executive department, to 
the Legislatures of the States, I deem it proper to observe that the steps taken 
by the Secretary of State, as detailed in the accompanying report, are to be 
considered as purely ministerial, and in no sense whatever committing the 
Executive to an approval or a recommendation of the amendment to the 
State Legislatures or to the people.73 
President Johnson’s view of the executive role as merely “ministerial” 
has survived. All subsequent presidents have dutifully performed the 
ministerial role of forwarding proposed amendments to the states for 
ratification without officially expressing approval or disapproval.74 
 
67 See Ames, supra note 9. 
68 Id. 
69 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 630 (1865) (Sen. Howe) (noting John Quincy Adams’s 
1803 vote). 
70 See supra Part I.B. 
71 See generally Kurt T. Lash, The Constitutional Referendum of 1866: Andrew Johnson and the 
Original Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause (Aug. 6, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2125363 (describing Johnson’s 
opposition to the Fourteenth Amendment and his efforts to defeat it, including by proposing an 
alternative). 
72 Although he did not veto the Fourteenth Amendment, President Johnson vetoed (and Congress 
overrode his vetoes on) all four Reconstruction Acts. See PRESIDENTIAL VETOES, 1789–1988, S. Pub. 
102-12, at 33–34 (1992) (listing vetoes and overrides of H.R. 1143, H.R. 33, H.R. 123, and H.J. Res. 
71). 
73 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3349 (1866) (emphasis added).  
74 Interestingly, the first amendment ratified after Reconstruction, the Sixteenth Amendment, was 
proposed by President Taft himself. William Howard Taft, Message Concerning Tax on Net Income of 
Corporations, Address Before Congress (June 16, 1909), in 1 PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES AND STATE 
PAPERS OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 166, 167 (1910) (“I therefore recommend to the Congress that both 
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT MANDATES PRESENTMENT 
Despite all three branches of government acquiescing in the exemption 
of constitutional amendment proposals from presentment, the text of the 
Constitution admits no such exemption. The Presentment Clause applies to 
“[e]very Order, Resolution, or Vote,”75 and Article V’s silence cannot 
create an implied exception to this unambiguous rule. 
A. Deconstructing Article I, Section 7 
As with any constitutional issue, the first place to look is the text.76 
Article I defines the powers and limitations of the Legislative Branch, and 
Section 7 defines the legislative process.77 The relevant part of the second 
clause reads: 
 Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the 
Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the 
United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with 
his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall 
enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If 
after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the 
Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by 
which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that 
House, it shall become a Law. . . . If any Bill shall not be returned by the 
President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been 
presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had 
signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in 
which Case it shall not be a Law.78 
Clause 2 defines the process of congressional lawmaking and 
describes the steps that “[e]very [b]ill” passing both houses of Congress 
must take before becoming law. First, Clause 2 requires the bill to “be 
presented to the President of the United States.”79 As discussed in Part IV, 
infra, the word “presented” is not defined anywhere in the Constitution. 
Next, the President must act: “If he approve he shall sign it . . . .”80 So 
disregarding the exceptions to be discussed shortly, a bill cannot become a 
 
Houses, by a two-thirds vote, shall propose an amendment to the Constitution conferring the power to 
levy an income tax upon the National Government without apportionment among the States in 
proportion to population.”). 
75 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3 (emphasis added). 
76 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 38 
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (noting that constitutional interpretation, like statutory interpretation, should 
rely on “the original meaning of the text”). The text is often the last place to look as well. 
77 The first clause of Section 7 deals with revenue bills and is inapposite to the presentment issue. It 
reads: “All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may 
propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. 
78 Id. cl. 2. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
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law unless the President signs it, presumably by scrawling on whatever 
copy of the bill Congress “presented” to him. Conversely, if the President 
does not “approve” of the bill, “he shall return it, with his Objections to 
that House in which it shall have originated.”81 Clause 2 thus imposes a 
duty on the President to return his copy of the presented bill, along with a 
list of his “Objections” to it, if he does not “approve” of the bill. Again, 
none of these terms—“presented,” “approve,” “sign,” “return”—are 
explicitly defined in the Constitution. 
The rest of Clause 2 describes the two ways in which a bill can 
become law even absent the President’s signature. First, Congress may 
override a presidential veto (by a two-thirds vote in each house). Second, if 
the President neither signs nor returns the bill within ten days of 
presentment—and Congress remains in session throughout this time—it 
automatically becomes law. But if Congress adjourns in the interim, the 
President’s inaction is a “pocket veto” and the bill does not become law 
(unless Congress overrides it, just as with a traditional veto).82 The 
importance of these procedures will become evident when evaluating 
previously enacted amendments, as described in Part IV, infra. 
Clause 3 in its entirety reads: 
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate 
and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of 
Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and 
before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being 
disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House 
of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the 
Case of a Bill.83 
Clause 3 seems to do no more than extend Clause 2’s requirement for bills 
to orders, resolutions, and votes (except for motions to adjourn), so that 
Congress cannot evade the presentment requirement by labeling its actions 
“resolutions” instead of “bills.” Indeed, this was likely the Framers’ intent 
in drafting Clause 3. James Madison recorded the following debate during 
the Philadelphia Convention of 1787: 
 Mr. MADISON, observing that if the negative of the President was confined 
to bills; it would be evaded by acts under the form and name of Resolutions, 
votes &c, proposed that [“]or resolve” should be added after “bill” in the 
beginning of sect 13. with an exception as to votes of adjournment &c.—
after a short and rather confused conversation on the subject, the question 
was put & rejected . . . .84 
 
81 Id. 
82 See id.; see also The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 676–77 (1929) (defining the term). 
83 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3. 
84 JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 465 (Adrienne 
Koch ed., 1966) (debate of Aug. 15, 1787). 
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Madison wanted to modify the language of Clause 2 to ensure that 
resolutions, votes, and other actions of Congress would also be subject to 
the same presentment requirement as bills. Interestingly, as Madison noted, 
“the question was put [and] rejected” 8–3.85 That is Madison’s last entry on 
August 15. His first entry on August 16 reads: 
 Mr. RANDOLPH having thrown into a new form the motion, putting votes, 
Resolutions &c. on a footing with Bills, renewed it as follows “Every order 
resolution or vote, to which the concurrence of the Senate & House of Reps. 
may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment and in the cases 
hereinafter mentioned) shall be presented to the President for his revision; 
and before the same shall have force shall be approved by him, or being 
disapproved by him shall be repassed by the Senate & House of Reps. 
according to the rules & limitations prescribed in the case of a Bill.”86 
This time, the motion passed 9–1. No evidence exists to explain why 
Madison’s proposal was soundly rejected while Randolph’s was easily 
adopted, or to explain what transpired during the “short and rather confused 
conversation on the subject” on August 15.87 All the same, the plain text 
(and common sense) reasonably suggests that Clause 3’s intent was to 
ensure that Congress did not evade Clause 2’s strictures simply by 
relabeling its actions.88 Taken together, Clauses 2 and 3 stand for the clear 
rule that all bicameral actions (except motions to adjourn) require 
presentment.89 
Three distinct features of Clause 3 are worth highlighting. First, 
Clause 3 requires that orders, resolutions, and votes, after being presented, 
“shall be approved by” the President before they take effect.90 But nowhere 
does Clause 3 require the President to actually sign them. So while a bill 
needs presidential signature to become law, an order, resolution, or vote 
does not.91 
 
85 Id.  
86 Id. at 466 (Aug. 16, 1787). 
87 Id. at 465 (Aug. 15, 1787). 
88 But see Seth Barrett Tillman, A Textualist Defense of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3: Why 
Hollingsworth v. Virginia Was Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha Was Wrongly Reasoned, 
83 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1314 (2005) (arguing that Randolph’s proposal could not have meant the same 
thing as Madison’s because otherwise seven states would not have changed their votes and because 
Convention rules did not permit a defeated motion to be reconsidered without one day’s notice). 
89 See Antonin Scalia, The Legislative Veto: A False Remedy for System Overload, REGULATION, 
Nov./Dec. 1979, at 19, 20 (“The purpose of [Art. I, § 7, cl. 3], as confirmed by accounts of the debate at 
the Constitutional Convention, is to prevent Congress from evading the President’s legislative role (as 
some state legislatures before 1789 had evaded gubernatorial veto powers) by simply acting through 
measures that are not called ‘bills.’ It was meant to ensure presidential participation in all lawmaking, 
under whatever form it might disguise itself.”). 
90 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3. 
91 That, at least, is the most straightforward reading of the text. Cf. Tillman, supra note 88, at 1319, 
1321 (rhetorically pointing this out but limiting the scope of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 to single-
house actions). For more detail on Professor Tillman’s interpretation of Clause 3, see infra note 114. 
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Second, if the President disapproves of an order, resolution, or vote, a 
two-thirds majority in each house is required to override his veto 
“according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.”92 
Here, Clause 3 specifically incorporates the rules from Clause 2—but only 
for the case of presidential disapproval. So while the President need not 
actually sign the order, resolution, or vote if he approves of it, the President 
must actually return it to the house of origin, describing his objections, if he 
disapproves of it. In addition, the ten-day limit for such a return would 
apply because this limit is one of the “Rules and Limitations prescribed in 
the Case of a Bill.” 
Third, Clause 3 specifically lists an exception to the presentment 
requirement: questions of adjournment.93 Why the Framers chose to include 
this particular exception is beyond the scope here,94 but by listing an 
exception, the Framers must have intended this to be the only exception.95 
All in all, Clauses 2 and 3 tell us three things. First, all bicameral 
actions of Congress require presentment; there are no exceptions (other 
than votes to adjourn), and this was the Framers’ intent. Second, only bills 
need to be signed to take effect;96 orders, resolutions, and votes need only 
be approved by the President but not necessarily signed. Third, if the 
President disapproves of a bill, order, resolution, or vote, he must take the 
active step of returning it to Congress within ten days of presentment (if 
Congress remains in session); otherwise, it becomes law. 
B. The Deafening Silence of Article V 
Article V specifies the manner in which the Constitution may be 
amended: 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, 
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the 
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for 
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents 
and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures 
of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths 
thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the 
Congress . . . .97 
Article V offers two methods for amendments to be proposed for 
adoption and two methods for amendments to be ratified; either method of 
 
92 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3. 
93 See id. 
94 For one take on the issue, see Tillman, supra note 88, at 1346–49. 
95 See J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 325, at 410 (1st ed. 1891) 
(describing the interpretative canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius). 
96 Ignoring, for the moment, instances where the President fails to take action within the ten-day 
window and Congress remains in session. See infra note 174 and accompanying text. 
97 U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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proposal may be combined with either method of ratification. The first 
method for proposing amendments is for two-thirds of both houses of 
Congress to pass the proposed constitutional amendment. The other method 
is for a constitutional convention to propose amendments. Only Congress 
can call this convention, and only after the legislatures of two-thirds of the 
states tell it to do so.98 Either way, Congress is involved—it proposes the 
amendments or it calls a convention for that purpose. All of the 
Constitution’s amendments have traveled the first route: Congress 
proposed them with two-thirds majorities in each house. The convention 
option has never been tried.99 
Article V is silent on presidential involvement in the amendment 
process. Although Congress features prominently, no mention whatsoever 
is made of the President. What to make of the silence of Article V? Does its 
failure to mention presentment mean that amendments need not be 
presented to the President? Or does its silence imply that the default, 
background rule—presentment—continues to apply? 
C. Article I, Section 7 Applies to Article V 
Article V’s silence cannot create an exception to the clear mandate of 
the Presentment Clause. Such an argument would, contrary to the text, treat 
the congressional powers in Article V as different from those in the rest of 
the Constitution, which are not granted such an exception. That the vote 
tally required to pass an amendment is the same as that required to override 
a presidential veto is also not sufficient to create such an implied exception 
to presentment. Similarly, the fact that amendments proposed by the 
(unused) convention method need not be presented to the President does 
not confer the same latitude on amendments proposed by Congress. To be 
sure, implied exceptions do exist in the Constitution, but the Article V 
amendment process is normatively different from these cases. Each of these 
arguments is taken up in detail below. 
1. The Plain Text.—Granting Article V an implied exception from 
the presentment requirement is an argument that proves too much. 
Presentment is only mentioned in Article I, Section 7; every other 
congressional power is listed without mention of presentment. If Article 
V’s silence is read to create an implied exception to the presentment 
 
98 Note that Congress “shall” call a convention upon application by the requisite number of state 
legislatures; that is, Congress must call the convention. Id. 
99 See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, Proposing Constitutional Amendments by Convention: Rules 
Governing the Process, 78 TENN. L. REV. 693, 709 (2011) (“[A] convention for proposing amendments 
has never been held . . . .”). Nor has the convention option for ratification been used, as expected even 
early on. See, e.g., ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 1:App. 371–72 (1803), 
reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 583 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) 
(“The latter will probably never be resorted to, unless the federal government should betray symptoms 
of corruption . . . .”). 
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requirement, then by that logic every congressional power granted in the 
Constitution would also enjoy an implied exception from presentment. 
That, of course, is nonsense. Congress has always presented to the 
President bills and resolutions passed pursuant to its powers granted in 
Article I,100 Article II,101 Article III,102 and Article IV.103 There is no textual 
reason why Article V should be any different. Article I, Section 7 functions 
as a background rule for all bicameral congressional action (except for 
adjournment), and only an express exception (such as the one for 
adjournment) can overcome the strong presumption in favor of 
presentment. 
Another textual objection might be that Article V only calls on 
Congress to “propose” amendments and thus falls outside of the scope of 
bills, orders, resolutions, or votes.104 But Congress is also empowered with 
“dipos[ing] of” territories or property,105 “declar[ing] the Punishment of 
Treason,”106 “[c]onsent[ing]” to various state actions,107 and “ordain[ing] 
and establish[ing]” inferior federal courts,108 among other powers.109 All of 
these are textual directives to Congress that have never been understood to 
fall outside of the legislative process defined by Article I. Congress’s 
“propos[al]” of amendments must similarly fall under its rubric. At any 
rate, constitutional amendments are adopted as joint resolutions of the 
 
100 For example, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, passed pursuant to Congress’s 
Article I, Section 8 tax power, was presented to and signed by President Obama. See Sheryl Gay 
Stolberg & Robert Pear, A Stroke of a Pen, Make that 20, and It’s Official, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2010, 
at A19. 
101 For example, Congress directs Electoral College members to meet “on the first Monday after 
the second Wednesday in December” following a presidential election. See 3 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). 
Congress’s power to do so derives from Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 (“The Congress may determine 
the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be 
the same throughout the United States.”). 3 U.S.C. § 7 was originally enacted in codified form as H.R. 
6412, 80th Cong. (1948). See 62 Stat. 672–73 (1948). It was presented to the President on June 21, 
1948, and was signed by him on June 25. See 94 CONG. REC. 9365 (1948) (indicating presentment of 
H.R. 6412 on June 21); id. at 9365, 9367 (message from the President indicating that he signed it on 
June 25). 
102 For example, the Judiciary Act of 1789 (“An act to regulate processes in the courts of the 
United States.”), regulating the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts pursuant 
to Article III, Section 2, was presented to the President on September 28, 1789, and recorded as signed 
by him on September 29. S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 91–93 (1789). 
103 For example, “[n]ew States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union.” U.S. CONST. art. 
IV, § 3. On December 3, 1818, Congress presented to the President a “resolution declaring the 
admission of the state of Illinois into the Union,” and President Monroe signed it that same day. H.R. 
JOURNAL, 15th Cong., 2d Sess. 60–61 (1818). 
104 U.S. CONST. art. V; see also id. art. I, § 7. 
105 Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
106 Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2. 
107 Id. art. I, § 10. 
108 Id. art. III, § 1. 
109 See, e.g., id. art. I, § 8. 
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House and Senate,110 squarely placing them within the express language of 
Clause 3.111 
The fact that Article V comes after Article I is also not enough to 
create an implicit exception. This argument again proves too much, for 
almost all of Congress’s powers are listed after Article I, Section 7 (the vast 
majority are in Section 8). What is more, Article I and Article V were 
drafted contemporaneously and are thus appropriately read as a unified 
whole in harmony with each other.112 This is distinguished from the case of 
a constitutional amendment, which might reasonably be thought to modify 
all antecedent clauses to the contrary.113 Therefore, Article V cannot 
constitute a later modification of, or implied exception to, the requirements 
of Article I. 
A final potential argument against applying the Presentment Clause to 
Article V is that, despite its clear language, Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 
actually refers only to orders, resolutions, and votes of a single house of 
Congress acting pursuant to a prior bicameral authorization of the 
subsequent single-house action.114 While creative and thought provoking, 
 
110 See The Constitutional Amendment Process, NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/
federal-register/constitution (“The Congress proposes an amendment in the form of a joint resolution.”) 
(last visited Jan. 6, 2013). 
111 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 767 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (“[A] joint 
resolution . . . by definition must be passed by both Houses and signed by the President.”). 
112 By contrast, the First Congress specifically rejected Madison’s proposal to interweave the text 
of subsequent amendments into the body of the Constitution, preferring to append them to the end of 
the document. See AMAR, supra note 38, at 458–59.  
113 For example, the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments are implicitly thought to have 
broadened the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections, despite the former never explicitly 
referring to the latter. See U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX; cf. id. amend. XIV. Similarly, the Fourteenth 
Amendment is thought to have created an implicit exception to the Eleventh Amendment, allowing 
Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Section 5 powers. See Fitzpatrick v. 
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty 
which it embodies, see Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), are necessarily limited by the 
enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
114 See Tillman, supra note 88, at 1321. Professor Tillman’s complicated thesis requires some 
explanation. Characterizing the language of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 as “needlessly syntactically 
complex and elliptical,” Professor Tillman concludes that it must have a meaning other than its plain 
one. Id. at 1318; see also id. at 1317–21 (listing five other reasons for seeking a different meaning). 
After querying parliamentary scholars, Professor Tillman decided that the correct reading of Article I, 
Section 7, Clause 3 is: 
 Every [final] Order, Resolution, or Vote [of a single house] to which the [prior] Concurrence 
of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary [as bicameral congressional 
authorization for subsequent single-house action] . . . shall be presented to the President [so that 
his veto might act upon the subsequent single-house action just as it acted upon the prior 
authorizing legislation] . . . and before the same [subsequent single-house action] shall take 
Effect [in conformity with the prior authorizing legislation], shall be approved by him, or being 
disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, 
according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill. 
Id. at 1321 (alterations in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3). Under this interpretation, 
Clause 3 does not apply to constitutional amendments at all because amendments proposed by Congress 
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this argument is wholly unsupported by the Constitution’s plain text, 
Madison’s notes, or any other contemporaneous discussion of the Clause. 
Indeed, the argument amounts to pure speculation, perhaps “the work of an 
overactive imagination.”115 
2. The Two-Thirds Requirement.—A two-thirds vote in each house 
is necessary to pass an amendment—the same supermajority required to 
override a presidential veto.116 Thus, one might argue, a proposed 
amendment need not be presented to the President because it has already 
been passed by a vote sufficient to override a potential veto.117 This 
superficially appealing argument breaks down for two reasons. First, such 
an argument based on principles of expediency proves too much: by this 
logic, if a regular piece of legislation happens to pass by a two-thirds 
majority in each house, would it, too, not be subject to the presentment 
requirement? Such a conclusion would be patently unconstitutional, despite 
the gains in efficiency that would come from avoiding a presidential veto 
(and subsequent votes to override it in both houses).118 Constitutionally 
mandated steps may not be skipped for expediency’s sake. 
Second, even though an amendment has already garnered a two-thirds 
majority in each house, there is no guarantee that it would continue to 
garner the same majority after a presidential veto.119 Vote tallies often 
change once the President has officially weighed in on a matter; indeed, 
vote tallies have almost always changed after a presidential veto. For 
example, President Obama vetoed H.J. Res. 64 on December 30, 2009, and 
H.R. 3808 on October 8, 2010.120 In the House, the votes to override these 
bills were 143–245 and 185–235, respectively.121 Not only did the votes to 
override President Obama’s vetoes for each of these two bills fail to reach 
the required two-thirds majorities, they failed to command even simple 
majorities, despite having originally cleared the House by voice votes 
 
pursuant to Article V are not the result of single-house actions taken pursuant to a prior bicameral 
authorization for such action. Professor Tillman thus believes that Hollingsworth v. Virginia was 
correctly decided, though not for reasons articulated by the Court (or by anyone else). See id. at 1364–
66. 
115 Id. at 1331 (conceding the audacity and novelty of this interpretation). 
116 Compare U.S. CONST. art. V (providing for the proposal of an amendment through the vote of 
two-thirds of both houses of Congress), with id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (requiring the vote of two-thirds of both 
houses of Congress for a bill vetoed by the President to become law). 
117 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 38, at 594–95 n.7. 
118 Removing the President’s ability to “carefully examine and consider a bill and determine, after 
due deliberation, whether he should approve or disapprove it” violates the separation of powers. The 
Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 677 (1929). 
119 Senator Howe made this very argument in 1865. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 631 
(1865) (statement of Sen. Howe) (noting that vote tallies can change after a presidential veto). 
120 See Vetoes by President Barack H. Obama, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/reference/
Legislation/Vetoes/ObamaBH.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2013). 
121 See id.  
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(generally reserved for bills with little or no opposition) and the Senate by 
unanimous consent (same).122 It is reasonable to conclude that the 
presidential veto had an impact on the override vote tallies. 
For a bill with support at or near the two-thirds threshold, the 
influence of a presidential veto can be dispositive.123 Presidential vetoes 
need not always influence the vote tally downwards; political forces may 
conspire to move the votes in either direction.124 An official presidential 
veto can influence the vote tallies in Congress, upwards or downwards, 
even when the votes are taken just days apart. In fact, an analysis of every 
presidential veto from 1993 to the present reveals that the vote tallies 
before and after the veto are almost never the same.125 So just because a 
 
122 See Bill Summary & Status, H.J. Res. 64, LIBRARY OF CONG. THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/
cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HJ00064:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Jan. 6, 2013); Bill Summary & 
Status, H.R. 3808, LIBRARY OF CONG. THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:
HR03808:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Jan. 6, 2013). 
123 For example, on August 31, 2000, President Clinton vetoed H.R. 8, the Death Tax Elimination 
Act of 2000. Although the bill initially passed the House by a vote of 279–136 (larger than a two-thirds 
majority), it failed a vote to override in the House by a vote of 274–157 (only a 63.6% majority, less 
than the required 66.7%). See PRESIDENTIAL VETOES, 1989–2000, S. PUB. 107–10, at 22–23 (2001), 
available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/presvetoes.pdf; Bill Summary & Status, 
H.R. 8, LIBRARY OF CONG. THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d106:HR00008:@@@L
&summ2=m& (last visited Jan. 6, 2013). 
 Sixteen more congressmen cast votes the second time around, but, curiously, most of them were 
Republicans who voted in favor of overriding the veto. Despite this, the number of votes in support of 
the bill dropped from 279 to 274, largely because only 53 Democrats voted to override President 
Clinton’s veto (compared to 65 Democrats who originally voted for the bill). See Final Vote Results for 
Roll Call 254, OFFICE OF THE CLERK, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2000/roll254.xml (last visited Jan. 6, 
2013) (recording original House vote on H.R. 8); Final Vote Results for Roll Call 458, OFFICE OF THE 
CLERK, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2000/roll458.xml (last visited Jan. 6, 2013) (recording final House 
vote on H.R. 8 in response to veto). Although President Clinton’s veto caused his political opponents to 
turn out in greater force against him, it simultaneously influenced his political allies to switch their 
votes and join his camp. Note that H.R. 8 originally passed the Senate by a vote of 59–39 (less than a 
two-thirds majority), Bill Summary & Status, H.R. 8, supra, and so the veto likely would have been 
sustained even had the House successfully overridden it. 
124 For example, President Clinton vetoed H.R. 4733, the Energy and Water Development 
Appropriations Act of 2001, on October 7, 2000. PRESIDENTIAL VETOES, 1989–2000, S. PUB. 107–10, 
at 23 (2001), available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/presvetoes.pdf. The measure 
had originally passed the House just over a week earlier, on September 28, by a vote of 301–118. Bill 
Summary & Status, H.R. 4733, LIBRARY OF CONG. THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
z?d106:HR04733:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Jan. 6, 2013). On October 11, the House voted to 
override President Clinton’s veto by a vote of 315–98. Id. Interestingly, while 44 Republicans voted 
against the bill initially, 13 days later only 28 Republicans voted to sustain the veto. See Final Vote 
Results for Roll Call 501, OFFICE OF THE CLERK, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2000/roll501.xml (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2013); Final Vote Results for Roll Call 523, OFFICE OF THE CLERK, http://clerk.house.
gov/evs/2000/roll523.xml (last visited Jan. 6, 2013). President Clinton’s veto again caused his political 
adversaries to abandon his camp, without a comparable countervailing impact on his political allies. 
125 Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama have vetoed a total of fifty-one bills. Of these, the House 
passed seven by a voice vote and failed to hold override votes on twenty-two more. Of the twenty-two 
remaining bills, only once did the vote tally to override exactly match the original vote tally—the 
Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 1997, H.R. 1122, 105th Cong. (enacted over a presidential veto). Thirteen 
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proposed amendment might have originally passed both houses by two-
thirds majorities does not necessarily mean that it would continue to garner 
that same level of support after a presidential veto. The two-thirds 
requirement is thus nothing but a counterfactual smokescreen that should 
not obscure the presentment requirement. 
3. The Convention Method.—Another objection to the clear textual 
mandate is that because a constitutional convention would not need to 
present its amendment proposals to the President, so too should Congress 
be free from having to present its amendment proposals.126 This argument 
from symmetry is unconvincing because—somewhat tautologically—the 
amendment methods are dissimilar. First, the Presentment Clause does not 
apply to the proceedings of a constitutional convention composed of state 
delegations because the convention’s actions are not bicameral actions of 
Congress.127 So the fact that the convention enjoys immunity from 
presentment does not imply that Congress does too. 
More importantly, this argument from symmetry proves too much. 
The Constitution explicitly calls for congressionally proposed amendments 
to pass by a two-thirds supermajority in each house. But Article V is silent 
on what fraction of convention delegates must vote for amendment 
proposals before they may be passed along to the state legislatures (or 
conventions). The argument from symmetry would suggest that a 
convention, too, must pass amendments by a two-thirds majority. But that 
 
bills saw lower support on their respective override votes, losing an average of roughly seven yea votes 
and gaining over four nay votes. The votes to override eight other bills, by contrast, gained an average 
of nearly ten yea votes and lost an average of over five nay votes.  
 In the Senate, nine of the fifty-one vetoed bills originally passed by voice vote or unanimous 
consent, and thirty-five more never had an override vote. Of the seven remaining bills, one had exactly 
the same override vote total as the original vote (the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1997). Another 
bill, the Water Resources Development Act of 2007, H.R. 1495, 110th Cong., lost two yea votes and 
gained two nay votes. The remaining five bills gained Senate support on the override vote, gaining an 
average of over one yea vote and losing an average of one-half nay votes. 
 A spreadsheet containing all of the relevant data above is on file with the Northwestern University 
Law Review. The data were compiled from information available at Bills, Resolutions, LIBRARY OF 
CONG. THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/bills_res.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2013) (click on “Browse 
Bills & Resolutions”; then select the appropriate congressional session; then click on “Bill Number”; 
then select the appropriate bill number). The list of bills vetoed by the last three presidents was taken 
from Summary of Bills Vetoed, 1789–Present, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/reference/
Legislation/Vetoes/vetoCounts.htm (click on the “Barack H. Obama,” “George W. Bush,” and 
“William J. Clinton” table entries) (last visited Jan. 6, 2013). 
126 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 38, at 595 n.7 (“On this view, Article V did not envisage any role 
for a presidential signature or veto in the case of an amendment proposal emerging from a duly called 
proposing convention; and an amendment proposal made by Congress should stand on the same 
footing.”). 
127 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. While amendment proposals passed by Congress are in the form of 
joint resolutions, see supra note 110, amendment proposals passed by a convention could not take such 
a form. 
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is plainly wrong.128 It is wrong because absent explicit language to the 
contrary, our constitutional democracy’s strong default presumption is one 
of simple majority rule.129 Article V’s silence on the vote required in a 
convention is not nearly enough to overcome this strong default 
presumption. So too with presentment. Article V’s silence is not enough to 
overcome the strong default presumption that all bicameral actions of 
Congress (except adjournment) must be presented to the President.130 The 
argument from symmetry thus fails even on its own terms.131 
4. Other Implied Exceptions in the Constitution.—The Constitution 
may well justify some implied exceptions, but Article V and presentment 
are easily distinguishable from these situations. For example, the President 
has long been able to make recess appointments of federal judges that 
“shall expire at the End of [the Senate’s] next session”132 even though 
Article III makes clear that all federal judges shall have life tenure.133 Even 
Supreme Court Justices have been appointed during Senate recesses: 
President Washington appointed John Rutledge to serve as Chief Justice 
during a Senate recess in 1795, and President Eisenhower named Chief 
Justice Warren, along with Justices Brennan and Stewart, to the Court 
through recess appointments.134 In all cases but Rutledge’s, the Justices 
 
128 See Note, Proposed Legislation on the Convention Method of Amending the United States 
Constitution, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1612, 1633–34 (1972). 
129 See United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 6 (1892) (“[T]he general rule of all parliamentary 
bodies is that, when a quorum is present, the act of a majority of the quorum is the act of the body. This 
has been the rule for all time, except so far as in any given case the terms of the organic act under which 
the body is assembled have prescribed specific limitations. . . . No such limitation is found in the 
Federal Constitution, and therefore the general law of such bodies obtains.”); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A 
TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE 
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 141 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1868) (“A simple majority of a 
quorum is sufficient, unless the constitution establishes some other rule . . . .”). 
130 Indeed, applying a consistent and reasonable textual approach, one must also conclude that the 
calling of the convention itself—as a bicameral action of Congress—would require presentment. See 
Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 206 
(1972) (“The exclusion of the President from the process of calling a convention is flatly and obviously 
unconstitutional under Article I, Section 7 . . . .”). Similarly, a consistent and reasonable textual 
approach would also require Congress to repeal proposed amendments by a two-thirds majority. See 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-
Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 683 (1993). 
131 The argument from symmetry has been invoked in other situations—for example, to argue 
against congressional promulgation of amendments. See Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of 
Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386, 399–400 (1983). 
132 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may 
happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their 
next Session.”). 
133 See id. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their 
Offices during good Behaviour . . . .”). 
134 See LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31112, RECESS APPOINTMENTS OF FEDERAL 
JUDGES 14–15 (2001). 
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were subsequently renominated and confirmed by the Senate, mooting the 
constitutional dilemma.135 At any rate, the implied exception to the life-
tenure requirement, unlike the Article V situation, has a plausible textual 
justification: the clause immediately preceding the Recess Appointment 
Clause specifically lists “Judges of the supreme Court” among the officials 
that the President may appoint.136 The Recess Appointments Clause and 
Article III thus squarely conflict, leaving only two possible resolutions: 
either the Clause is an implicit exception to Article III or “Judges of the 
supreme Court” are implicit exceptions to the President’s recess 
appointment power. Either choice requires finding an exception to a rule, 
making this case closer to an express rather than a purely implied 
exception.137 Article V has no such textual justification. 
Applying the Presentment Clause to Article V does not present the 
normative difficulties that accompany another implied exception in the 
Constitution: the (in)ability of the Vice President to preside over his own 
impeachment proceedings. Article I, Section 3 provides that “[t]he Vice 
President of the United States shall be President of the Senate.”138 Section 3 
goes on to provide that “[t]he Senate shall have the sole Power to try all 
Impeachments. . . . When the President of the United States is tried, the 
Chief Justice shall preside . . . .”139 Put differently, the Vice President 
presides over all Senate activities except for presidential impeachment 
proceedings. And because the Framers explicitly listed this one exception 
to the general rule, they must have intended this to be the only exception.140 
Indeed, this exception closely mirrors the Presentment Clause’s 
adjournment exception. Yet nobody could seriously contend that the Vice 
President should preside over his own impeachment trial.141 Normative 
concerns dictate this conclusion: the impartiality and fairness of a trial 
would be compromised if the presiding officer were the one standing 
accused.142 Allowing a member of the Executive Branch to preside over his 
 
135 Id. at 14–16. Washington renominated Rutledge after the Senate reconvened, but the Senate 
defeated the nomination and Rutledge resigned his recess appointment commission (after a failed 
suicide attempt). Id. at 14–15. 
136 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
137 See, e.g., Diana Gribbon Motz, The Constitutionality and Advisability of Recess Appointments 
of Article III Judges, 97 VA. L. REV. 1665, 1666–67 (2011). Of course, as Judge Motz argues, the text 
alone cannot tell us which is the exception and which is the rule. Id. 
138 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. 
139 Id. cl. 6. 
140 See, e.g., SUTHERLAND, supra note 95. 
141 See, e.g., Joel K. Goldstein, Can the Vice President Preside at His Own Impeachment Trial?: A 
Critique of Bare Textualism, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 849 (2000). But see Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
Someone Should Have Told Spiro Agnew, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 245 (1997) (contending that the Vice 
President should preside over his own impeachment trial). 
142 These normative concerns are reminiscent of those implicated by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment, which requires a neutral adjudicator to preside over trials. See, e.g., Borough of 
Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2505 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
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own impeachment proceedings could also arguably violate the 
constitutionally mandated separation of powers.143 That is why an implied 
exception to the general rule of the Vice President’s senatorial powers is 
warranted in the case of his own impeachment proceedings. But none of 
these concerns apply to the presentment of amendment proposals. As 
described in Part III, infra, normative and structural concerns actually 
militate in favor of not finding an exception. 
In sum, the plain text of the Constitution requires presentment of 
amendments passed under Article V because all bicameral congressional 
action is subject to the presentment requirement. Indeed, at least two other 
state supreme courts that faced nearly identical textual provisions—those of 
Wyoming144 and Montana145—interpreted their respective constitutions to 
 
dissenting in part) (recognizing “the due process right to a neutral adjudicator”). This is not to say, 
however, that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies to impeachment proceedings. Cf. 
Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Federal Impeachment and Criminal Procedure: The Framers’ Intent, 52 MD. L. 
REV. 437, 454 (1993) (noting that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial does not apply to 
impeachment proceedings). 
143 Impeachment proceedings are constitutionally committed to the Legislative Branch. See U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. Whether the Vice President could preside over the impeachment trial of a lower 
federal executive official is an interesting constitutional question that has neither arisen nor been 
resolved. Only one nonpresidential executive officer has been impeached: War Secretary William 
Belknap in 1876. See Jonathan Turley, Senate Trials and Factional Disputes: Impeachment as a 
Madisonian Device, 49 DUKE L.J. 1, 44, 53 (1999). But the vice presidency was vacant at the time, Vice 
President of the United States (President of the Senate), U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/
artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2013) (noting that Vice 
President Henry Wilson “died in office on November 22, 1875; vice presidency remained vacant until 
1877”), and so the President pro tempore of the Senate presided over Belknap’s impeachment 
proceedings, see EXTRACTS FROM THE JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE IN ALL CASES OF 
IMPEACHMENT PRESENTED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1798–1904, S. DOC. NO. 62–876, at 
329 (1912) (noting that the “President of the Senate pro tempore” was presiding). Belknap’s 
impeachment proceedings are of dubious precedential value for another reason: he had already 
resigned, causing many Senators to conclude that the Senate lacked jurisdiction over the case. Michael 
J. Broyde & Robert A. Schapiro, Impeachment and Accountability: The Case of the First Lady, 
15 CONST. COMMENT. 479, 488–90 (1998). 
144 See Geringer v. Bebout, 10 P.3d 514, 521 (Wyo. 2000). Article 20, section 1 of the Wyoming 
Constitution specifies the procedure for enacting constitutional amendments but, like Article V of the 
U.S. Constitution, makes no mention of presentment. Id. at 520. The Wyoming Supreme Court held that 
“[t]he language of Art. 3, § 41 [with language nearly identical to that of Art. I, § 7, cl. 3 of the U.S. 
Constitution] is broad and inclusive, using the words ‘every order, resolution or vote.’ We are confident 
that this language encompasses a vote to propose a constitutional amendment.” Id. at 521. 
145 See State ex rel. Livingstone v. Murray, 354 P.2d 552, 556 (Mont. 1960). At the time, 
article XIX, section 9 of the Montana Constitution, like Article V of the U.S. Constitution, specified the 
procedure for enacting constitutional amendments but made no mention of presentment. Id. at 556–57. 
Article V, section 40 had language nearly identical to that of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 of the U.S. 
Constitution, requiring that “[e]very order, resolution or vote, in which the concurrence of both houses 
may be necessary” must “be presented to the governor.” Id. at 556. The Montana Supreme Court held 
that constitutional amendments must be presented to the governor because article V, section 40 “means 
just what it says . . . . [It] is clear, certain, direct and unambiguous, and in the English language; it 
speaks for itself; it needs no interpretation . . . .” Id. Today, however, Montana’s constitution excludes 
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require gubernatorial presentment of state constitutional amendments.146 
Arguments to the contrary tend to prove too much, for they would 
eviscerate the presentment requirement for nearly all congressional action 
if taken to their logical conclusions. 
III. PRESENTMENT SHOULD APPLY AS A NORMATIVE MATTER 
Normative concerns bolster the textual argument that constitutional 
amendment proposals must be presented to the President for approval or 
veto. Presentment would preserve the structural balance and separation of 
powers, keeping alive the vital checks and balances crucial to our system. It 
would also ensure that the President, one of two officials elected by a 
nationwide vote, has an official say in the Republic’s most important 
lawmaking process. 
Presentment of amendments is important from a structural perspective. 
The President is involved in legislation of far less importance147 than 
constitutional amendments. This is by design: the Framers did not want 
Congress to be able to act alone and completely bypass the Executive 
Branch. Rather, they envisioned the presidential veto as a necessary check 
on the Legislative Branch: 
[T]he power in question . . . furnishes an additional security against the 
enaction of improper laws. It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative 
body calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction, 
precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may 
happen to influence a majority of that body.148 
Furthermore, the Framers specifically thought that the veto power was 
necessary for ensuring a proper separation of powers between the branches: 
 
from this requirement “bills proposing amendments to the Montana constitution” and “bills ratifying 
proposed amendments to the United States constitution.” MONT. CONST. art. 6, § 10, cl. 1. 
146 Although not directly on point, it is curious to note that the Confederate States of America 
(CSA), who largely adopted the U.S. Constitution when drafting their own, chose to modify Article V 
to eliminate the dilemma altogether: 
Upon the demand of any three States, legally assembled in their several conventions, the 
Congress shall summon a convention of all the States, to take into consideration such 
amendments to the Constitution as the said States shall concur in suggesting at the time when 
the said demand is made: and should any of the proposed amendments to the Constitution be 
agreed on by the said convention—voting by States—and the same be ratified by the 
Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, or by conventions in two-thirds thereof—as the 
one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the general convention, they shall 
thenceforward form a part of this Constitution. 
CONFEDERATE STATES OF AM. CONST. art. V, § 1, cl. 1. That is, the CSA eliminated the congressional-
proposal option for amendments and only retained the convention option—an option that the Union had 
not (and still has not) used. 
147 “[I]nfinitely less importance,” in the words of Tilghman and Rawle. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 379 (1798) (argument of petitioner Hollingsworth’s attorneys). 
148 THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 37, at 495 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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 The propensity of the legislative department to intrude upon the rights and 
to absorb the powers of the other departments, has been already suggested 
and repeated; the insufficiency of a mere parchment delineation of the 
boundaries of each, has also been remarked upon; and the necessity of 
furnishing each with constitutional arms for its own defence, has been 
inferred and proved. From these clear and indubitable principles results the 
propriety of a negative, either absolute or qualified, in the executive, upon 
the acts of the legislative branches. Without the one or the other the former 
would be absolutely unable to defend himself against the depredations of the 
latter. He might gradually be stripped of his authorities by successive 
resolutions, or annihilated by a single vote. And in the one mode or the 
other, the legislative and executive powers might speedily come to be 
blended in the same hands.149 
The veto power was (and is) the most powerful tool available to the 
President to defend himself against legislative encroachment and to prevent 
legislative and executive powers from becoming “blended in the same 
hands.”150 
All of these arguments apply with equal force to constitutional 
amendments. If anything, they carry even more force. Normal legislation 
can always be repealed by simple majorities in subsequent congressional 
sessions; constitutional amendments cannot.151 So there is an even greater 
need for the President “to guard the community against the effects of 
faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good.”152 
What is more, the entire notion of separation of powers is constitutional in 
nature; no statute defines our system of checks and balances.153 So the only 
way to change the balance of power between the branches is to amend the 
Constitution. How odd, then, if this were the one area in which the 
President lacks the veto power, rendering him powerless to defend the 
Executive Branch from the only method capable of permanently disabling 
it.154 The entire structure of our federal government thus militates in favor 
of a presidential role in the amendment process. 
It is no answer that constitutional amendments are ultimately ratified 
by the states, thereby providing the necessary check on Congress. As a 
structural matter, states are best poised to “focus on the unique impact that 
 
149 Id. at 494 (footnote omitted). 
150 Id. 
151 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (repealing the Eighteenth Amendment). 
152 THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 37, at 495 (Alexander Hamilton). 
153 See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 99–102 (1995) (arguing 
that “[t]he separation-of-powers protections are, in fact, explicitly embodied in the [constitutional] 
text”). 
154 But see Note, supra note 128, at 1623 (finding it reasonable to exclude the President from the 
amendment process because his veto is only meant to protect incursions on the Executive Branch by 
Congress, not by the states). 
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a problem may have in a particular geographical or economic area,”155 not 
to defend the powers of the President or the federal Executive Branch. “By 
dividing power on a vertical as well as lateral plane (that is, between the 
state and federal governments), [the Framers] sought to assure that not all 
policy decisions would be made at one political level.”156 In other words, 
each branch of government (including the states) was expected to be in 
tension with the others. Indeed, the Framers were likely more concerned 
with the tensions between the federal government and the states than 
between the branches of the as-yet undefined federal government.157 So 
relying on states—themselves competing “branches” of the federalist 
constitutional structure—to police the potential aggrandizement of 
Congress at the expense of the President is akin to having the fox guard the 
henhouse. State ratification of constitutional amendments is a structural 
protection that is in addition to, not instead of, a presidential veto power. 
Another normative reason supporting presidential involvement in the 
amendment process is that the President is the only government official 
who is elected on a nationwide basis, other than the Vice President.158 
Congressmen represent their own districts, Senators their own states.159 
Only the President, accountable to all American citizens, brings a 
nationwide perspective that rises above the more provincial concerns of 
individual congressmen.160 As discussed earlier, a presidential veto of 
normal legislation induces changes in the vote tallies in Congress.161 This 
effect would presumably be amplified in the case of a constitutional 
amendment, where the stakes are much higher. The President’s nationwide 
voice is an important and valuable contribution to the political dialogue. 
One objection may be that the President is perfectly capable of lending 
his voice to the dialogue even without a formal veto. As the de facto leader 
of his political party, the President is likely to have influence over 
constitutional amendment proposals as they wend their way through 
Congress. And later on, the President’s public statements would likely 
influence the various state legislatures who would have to ratify these 
amendments. But this objection fails to consider political accountability. 
An official veto demonstrates a type of transparent “political commitment” 
 
155 REDISH, supra note 153, at 25 (describing the American federalist structure). 
156 Id. at 4. 
157 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 37, at 318–22 (James Madison) (discussing “the 
disposition, and the faculty” that the federal and state governments have “to resist and frustrate the 
measures of each other,” and listing ways in which the tension could be minimized). 
158 Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3 (describing the selection of Congressmen and Senators), 
with id. art. II, § 1 (providing for the election of the President). See also id. amend. XII (modifying the 
procedure to elect the Vice President); id. amend. XVII (calling for direct election of Senators). 
159 See id. art. I, §§ 2–3; id. amend. XVII. 
160 See, e.g., The FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 37, at 318 (James Madison) (“[T]he members of 
the Federal Legislature will be likely to attach themselves too much to local objects.”). 
161 See supra Part II.C. 
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that is essential to our democracy.162 Public statements and the bully pulpit 
are, to be sure, effective weapons in the President’s arsenal, but nothing 
speaks louder than an official endorsement (signature) or rejection (veto) of 
congressional action. After all, the White House has always made its views 
on pending legislation known—and yet, as described earlier, congressional 
vote tallies are almost never the same before and after an official 
presidential veto.163 
Another normative objection to presidential involvement is that the 
Constitution is already devilishly difficult to amend; adding a presidential 
veto will only make it worse. This is true. But it is of no matter. A 
constitution that is relatively difficult to amend minimizes the chance that 
the fleeting whims of a transient supermajority become constitutionalized 
and thereby bind future generations.164 That is not to say that all methods of 
increasing the difficulty of amending the Constitution are desirable. For 
example, simply increasing the required supermajority in Congress to, say, 
three-fourths or four-fifths (or nine-tenths) would be one way to protect 
future generations from such fleeting whims. But such a scheme would 
allow small congressional minorities or fringe groups to hijack the 
amendment process, perhaps making the Constitution virtually impossible 
to amend.165 That sort of obstacle to the amendment process would be 
normatively undesirable. 
Adding the President to the process is an obstacle of a different kind. 
Being nationally elected, the President is far less likely to fall captive to 
parochial interests or to narrow fringe groups than a small group of 
congressmen or Senators.166 What is more, the mere possibility of a 
presidential veto would ensure that Congress would craft its amendment 
proposals to respect the Executive Branch, which in turn would ensure that 
 
162 The political commitment principle, in the context of legislative action, is described in REDISH, 
supra note 153, at 137, 157–61. See also Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative 
Deception, Separation of Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory of 
United States v. Klein, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 451–53 (2006). The colloquial equivalent would be 
“putting one’s money where one’s mouth is.” 
163 See supra Part II.C. 
164 See AMAR, supra note 38, at 287–89 (reviewing various state constitutional amendment 
procedures rejected by the Framers as models for Article V, including several (such as South 
Carolina’s) that were more easily amendable). Of course, even Article V is not foolproof against the 
fleeting whims of transient supermajorities. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed).  
165 The requirement of unanimity to amend the Articles of Confederation was one feature the 
Framers specifically wished to relax. Madison summarized the view as stated by Hamilton: “It had been 
wished by many and was much to have been desired that an easier mode for introducing amendments 
had been provided by the articles of Confederation.” MADISON, supra note 84, at 609 (footnotes 
omitted). 
166 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2311 & n.261 (2001) 
(noting “past Presidents’ relative lack of partisanship” due to “the incentives provided by a national 
constituency”). 
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due thought goes into the proposals.167 In sum, any increased difficulty in 
amending the Constitution as a result of presidential involvement is a good 
kind of difficulty, one we should eagerly embrace. 
IV. IS THE CONSTITUTION UNCONSTITUTIONAL? 
Despite the textual and normative reasons for enforcing a presentment 
requirement for amendments, in light of clearly settled law, reinstating the 
presentment requirement for Article V amendments would likely require a 
new constitutional amendment. This is because there are only two 
interpretations: either the Constitution requires presentment of amendments 
or it does not.168 The latter interpretation (the one adopted to varying 
degrees by all three branches of government) means that although virtually 
all congressional action requires presentment, the most important 
congressional act—proposing constitutional amendments—does not. The 
former interpretation, which I advocate, potentially means that all previous 
amendments (except the Thirteenth) were unconstitutionally enacted and 
are therefore void. This is a disturbing proposition, admittedly at odds with 
the interpretive technique of allowing long-standing practice to fix the 
meaning of constitutional text.169 
But a new constitutional amendment would be a curious way to restore 
Article V’s textual, structural, and normatively desirable meaning. Is there 
any way to require presentment for future amendments without nullifying 
all of the previous ones? One possible solution is to adopt broad definitions 
of “presentment” and “approval” such that simple transmittal to the 
President of a copy of the amendment suffices for the former and the 
President’s failure to return an amendment to Congress with his objections 
suffices for the latter. Under this approach, all twenty-seven amendments 
have in fact been presented and approved. We can thus adopt a presentment 
requirement for future amendments while allowing previously enacted 
amendments to remain settled and valid law.170 
 
167 “Article V sensibly required Congress to get outside approval, a requirement that would deter 
many self-aggrandizing amendments from even being proposed and would prevent other ill-advised 
schemes from being adopted.” AMAR, supra note 38, at 290. Although Professor Amar is referring to 
the states giving “outside approval,” his reasoning applies with equal force to the President, in 
particular when the “self-aggrandizing amendments” come at the expense of the Executive Branch. 
168 See SCALIA, supra note 76, at 40 (embracing “the rule that a text does not change” over time 
because the Constitution’s “whole purpose is to prevent change”). 
169 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (“[C]ontemporaneous legislative 
exposition of the Constitution . . . , acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the construction to be 
given its provisions.”); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929) (“Long settled and established 
practice is a consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions of this 
character.”). 
170 Another “solution” is to invoke stare decisis to treat the existing twenty-seven amendments as 
validly enacted and of continued prospective legal force, while simultaneously adopting the textually 
correct interpretation presented here for any future amendment proposals. See SCALIA, supra note 76, at 
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As discussed in Part II, amendments are passed as joint resolutions,171 
and resolutions (along with orders and votes) need only be “approved” by 
the President, not signed.172 Conversely, presidential disapproval, even for 
an order, resolution, or vote, requires an affirmative act—that is, the 
President must return the parchment or copy to Congress listing the 
objections.173 These two provisions combine to yield a strong default 
presumption in favor of finding presidential approval, a presumption 
overcome only by clear evidence to the contrary. 
Lending further credence to this default presumption is that the 
Constitution permits legislation passed by Congress to automatically 
become law in the face of presidential inaction, as long as Congress 
remains in session for ten days following its passage.174 This reinforces the 
notion that only affirmative steps on the part of the President to return a 
bill, order, resolution, or vote to Congress can constitute disapproval. 
Furthermore, the definition of “presented” can be interpreted broadly to 
simply mean the physical act of transmitting a parchment or copy of the 
amendment to the President. This was precisely what Senator Howe said in 
the February 7, 1865 Senate debate: 
[T]he resolution now pending declares that it was unnecessary to present [the 
amendment] to [the President]. I do not think that follows, even if the 
premises are as stated; for if it had not been presented to the President, I ask 
you, sir, and I ask the Senate, how would it have been transmitted to the 
Legislatures of the States? . . . It would not go to the State Department unless 
presented to the President.175 
Under this definition, all previous amendments have been presented to the 
President for the simple reason that Congress has always asked the 
 
139 (“The whole function of the doctrine [of stare decisis] is to make us say that what is false under 
proper analysis must nonetheless be held to be true, all in the interest of stability.”).  
 A principled justification for such an approach is that once a constitutional amendment is ratified by 
the requisite number of states, all pre-ratification defects are cured. Under this view, the salient feature 
of constitutional amendments is that they are ratified by the states (either legislatures or conventions 
therein). So once three-fourths of the states ratify an amendment, it becomes constitutionally valid 
irrespective of any constitutional defects in the proposal process. This state-centric view of amendment 
ratification is bolstered by the fact that amendments can also be proposed by the states themselves at a 
national convention with no federal involvement whatsoever (other than for Congress to perform its 
mandatory and ministerial duty to call the convention). U.S. CONST. art. V. While undoubtedly 
problematic as a textual matter, such an approach might be justifiable from a federalist standpoint: if the 
Constitution is a compact among states, then it would make sense that states are the ultimate arbiters of 
what is and is not a part of the Constitution. But see U.S. CONST. pmbl. (stating that “We the People,” 
and not the states, are the sovereign bodies forming the Constitution). 
171 See Constitutional Amendment Process, supra note 110 (noting that amendments are proposed 
by joint resolution). 
172 See supra Part II.A. 
173 See supra Part II.A. 
174 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
175 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 630 (1865). 
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Executive Branch to distribute amendment proposals to the various 
states.176 
Because no President has ever returned an amendment proposal to 
Congress, these broad definitions of presentment and approval would save 
all but two sets of amendments. Table 1 lists for each amendment its 
proposal date, the last date of the proposing congressional session, and the 
number of days in between proposal and recess or adjournment.177 
TABLE 1: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 
Amendment Date Proposed Last Date of Session No. Days 
1–10; 27 9/25/1789 9/29/1789 4 
11 3/4/1794 6/9/1794 97 
12 12/9/1803 3/27/1804 109 
13 1/31/1865 3/3/1865 31 
14 6/13/1866 7/28/1866 45 
15 2/26/1869 3/3/1869 5 
16 7/12/1909 8/5/1909 24 
17 5/13/1912 8/26/1912 105 
18 12/18/1917 12/18/1917 0 
19 6/4/1919 7/1/1919 27 
20 3/2/1932 7/16/1932 136 
21 2/20/1933 3/3/1933 11 
22 3/21/1947 7/27/1947 128 
 
176 What is more, all joint resolutions—which include constitutional amendments, see supra note 
110—that pass both Houses must by law be printed, “signed by the presiding officers of both Houses 
and sent to the President of the United States.” 1 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). Section 106 was originally 
enacted in 1947, 61 Stat. 634 (1947), as part of an “ambitious” program to “enact[] into positive 
law . . . all the titles of the United States Code,” H.R. REP. NO. 80-251, at 2 (1947). But the reenactment 
into positive law was to be “without any material change” in the substantive law, id. (emphasis added), 
and so the requirement that all joint resolutions be presented to the President must have predated the 
enactment of § 106. Congress, at least, considered § 106 to be the reenactment—“without any material 
change”—of a resolution originally passed in 1893 and amended in 1895. Id. at 5–6. 
177 Proposal dates are from HUCKABEE, supra note 44, at 4 tbl.1. Congressional session dates are 
from PRESIDENTIAL VETOES, 1789–1988, S. Pub. 102-12, at x–xxvi tbl.2 (1992). 
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Amendment Date Proposed Last Date of Session No. Days 
23 6/17/1960 7/3/1960 16 
24 8/27/1962 10/13/1962 47 
25 7/6/1965 10/23/1965 109 
26 3/23/1971 4/7/1971 15 
 
Only the Bill of Rights (including the Twenty-Seventh Amendment), 
the Fifteenth Amendment, and the Eighteenth Amendment passed both 
houses of Congress within ten days of a congressional recess or 
adjournment, thereby requiring some further evidence of “approv[al]” to 
legitimize. 
The case of the Eighteenth Amendment is obviously moot.178 As for 
the Bill of Rights, Congress undoubtedly presented it to President 
Washington for distribution to the states.179 Washington had already 
indicated his approval of whatever amendments Congress chose to 
propose180 and did not “disapprove” of them. Indeed, Washington explicitly 
recognized the urgency and desirability of amending the Constitution: 
In his First Inaugural Address, President Washington went out of his way to 
mention that suitably drafted amendments might answer various “objections 
which have been urged against” the Constitution and thereby reduce 
skeptics’ “inquietude.” . . . Washington devoted more than 10 percent of his 
brief address to the topic of amendments, advising Congress to consider 
whether the new Constitution might be revised so as to “impregnably 
fortif[y]” the “characteristic rights of freemen” without “endanger[ing] the 
benefits of an united and effective government.”181 
To be sure, Washington delivered these remarks well before Congress 
passed the amendment proposals. But his post-passage actions were fully 
consistent with his inaugural address: Washington promptly sent copies of 
 
178 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1 (“The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States is hereby repealed.”). 
179 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 948 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (“On motion, it was resolved, that 
the President of the United States be requested to transmit to the Executives of the several States which 
have ratified the Constitution, copies of the amendments proposed by Congress, to be added thereto, 
and like copies to the Executives of the States of Rhode Island and North Carolina.”); S. JOURNAL, 1st 
Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1789) (Senate concurring in the resolution). 
180 See Washington, supra note 8; see also supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
181 AMAR, supra note 38, at 318 (alterations in original). Professor Amar notes in the quoted 
passage that because of Washington’s role “as president[,] he had no official part to play in the 
amendment process,” citing Hollingsworth. Id. at 318, 594–95 n.7. 
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the amendments to the states, which strongly suggests that he indeed 
“approved” of them.182 
The Fifteenth Amendment was passed just five days before Congress 
adjourned, and, unlike Washington with the Bill of Rights, President 
Andrew Johnson may not have fully supported its enactment.183 
Nevertheless, President Johnson promptly delivered copies of the Fifteenth 
Amendment (as he did with the Fourteenth) to the states within days of its 
passage,184 perhaps waiving any right to a pocket veto.185 
A natural objection to the preceding analysis is that if “presentment” 
and “approval” can be so loosely defined, then why bother changing the 
interpretation of Article V? After all, if the path traveled by the first 
twenty-seven amendment proposals was constitutionally sufficient under 
these broad definitions, then why change practices now? The answer, of 
course, lies in the normative justifications for an increased presidential role: 
a more robust separation of powers, the importance of constitutional 
amendments vis-à-vis normal legislation, the uniquely nationwide 
perspective that the President lends to the process, and the importance of a 
presidential “political commitment.”186 These reasons do not apply with the 
same force to previously enacted amendments that are part of settled law. 
More to the point, none of these normative goals would be furthered by 
invalidating previously enacted amendments. That is why it makes 
 
182 Because President Washington so clearly approved of the Bill of Rights, perhaps even the 
National Archives can be forgiven the error of assuming that “President George Washington signed this 
resolution on October 2, 1789 and forwarded copies to the 11 states that had ratified the U.S. 
Constitution [and also to] Rhode Island and North Carolina . . . .” Press Release, Nat’l Archives, The 
National Archives Presents the ORIGINAL Bill of Rights—with 12 Amendments! (Dec. 7, 2010) 
(emphasis added), available at http://www.preview.archives.gov/press/press-releases/2011/nr11-
21.html. 
183 Because President Johnson opposed the Fourteenth Amendment and the Reconstruction Acts, it 
stands to reason that he did not support the Fifteenth Amendment either. See supra Part I.C. 
184 President Johnson must have sent the copies immediately, because the first state to ratify the 
Fifteenth Amendment, Nevada, did so on March 1, just three days after Congress passed the 
amendment. ROBERT BRADY, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AS AMENDED, H.R. DOC. 
NO. 110-50, at 18 (2007). Furthermore, President Ulysses S. Grant, who took office on March 4—well 
within the ten-day window—clearly approved of the amendment; after the Fifteenth Amendment was 
ratified, President Grant took the “unusual” step of “notify[ing] the two Houses of Congress . . . of the 
ratification of a constitutional amendment,” because “of the vast importance of the fifteenth 
amendment” whose adoption “completes the greatest civil change and constitutes the most important 
event that has occurred since the nation came into life.” Ulysses S. Grant, Message to the Senate and 
House of Representatives (Mar. 30, 1870), in 7 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE 
PRESIDENTS 1789–1897, at 55, 55–56 (James D. Richardson ed., 1898). 
185 In The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 677 (1929), the Supreme Court emphasized that the 
reason for a strict ten-day window is to give the President enough time to “carefully examine and 
consider a bill and determine, after due deliberation, whether he should approve or disapprove it.” In 
this case, because President Johnson examined the joint resolution and promulgated it to the states 
sometime before March 1, he had already concluded his “due deliberation,” rendering Congress’s 
March 3 adjournment moot. 
186 See supra Part III. 
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normative sense to apply the presentment requirement prospectively but not 
retroactively. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the clear textual, structural, and normative reasons that dictate 
presentment of constitutional amendment proposals, all three branches of 
government have eventually adopted or acquiesced in a practice of 
sidestepping the President. Given this extensive history, the issue must be 
treated as settled law. That said, I have offered a theoretical perspective to 
restore the proper meaning and practice for future amendments without 
invalidating the existing twenty-seven. 
But requiring that future constitutional amendment proposals be 
presented to the President raises another question: Who will enforce the 
requirement? In theory, the Supreme Court could enforce the requirement 
ex post if someone challenged an amendment’s validity.187 But given the 
precedent of Hollingsworth (and the reiteration of Hollingsworth’s holding 
in INS v. Chadha), the Supreme Court is unlikely to do so. 
A surer way would be for the President to take the initiative, either by 
signing or vetoing constitutional amendment proposals that land on the 
Oval Office’s desk. Although a signature is not necessary to denote 
approval, signing an amendment proposal would be a symbolic way for the 
President to signal an official role in the process. It is hard to imagine that 
the Supreme Court would object to a presidential signature on a 
constitutional amendment (even assuming someone could be found with 
standing to litigate the issue), especially given the precedent of the 
Thirteenth Amendment. 
More dramatically, the President could veto an amendment proposal. 
The Court would likely refrain from interfering in this situation as well. 
Even assuming someone could be found with standing to challenge such a 
veto, this would seem to present a classic political question: “[T]he 
impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without 
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government”—
here, the Executive Branch—is self-evident.188 In this way, the President 
could act unilaterally to reclaim the Executive’s rightful role in the 
 
187 See Note, supra note 128, at 1622 (“[T]he courts, the government branch primarily responsible 
for constitutional interpretation and protection, will not give effect to amendments which have not 
satisfied the requirements of article V.” (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 1642 (“Once a controversy 
was within the general jurisdiction of a federal court, it would determine the validity of the amendment 
involved. Since a court cannot be made to apply a rule of law which it finds to be unconstitutional, 
congressional attempts to exclude judicial review of an amendment’s validity would be to no avail.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
188 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); cf. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 457 (1939) 
(Black, J., concurring) (“[W]hether submission, intervening procedure or Congressional determination 
of ratification conforms to the commands of the Constitution, calls for decisions by a ‘political 
department’ of questions of a type which this Court has frequently designated ‘political.’”). 
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constitutional amendment process. Upon reflection, it appears that Herman 
Cain’s “grasp of the Constitution” is quite firm—perhaps even 
(unwittingly) sophisticated—after all. 
 
